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Abstract
The public sphere is increasingly being depicted as a site of inadequately assessed risk
when American undergraduates post blogs, videos, and Facebook updates that become
viral, prompting others to mutter ‘don’t they know better than to press send?’ In this
article, I offer an analytical frame for such posting that does not re-inscribe US tenden-
cies to attribute ignorance or misguided selfishness to unwelcome behavior. In the
United States, there are multiple and mutually defining understandings of how publics
are constituted. Historically, these ideas often change when Americans respond to the
ways new technologies alter how communication is made public or private. This is an
ethnographic account of one way that multiple publics are seen to co-exist uneasily as
people negotiate the newness of new media. Grounded in my ethnographic research,
I explore how cautionary stories about ‘pressing send’ reflect neoliberal concerns about
allocating risk and responsibility among individual choice-makers.
Keywords
public sphere, risk, neoliberalism, publics, United States, anonymity, new media, public
vs. private, access
In October 2010, a story circulated in the US media about an email mishap. Karen
Owens, a Duke undergraduate, sent an email with a PowerPoint attachment to a
handful of her friends. The attachment was a parody of an honors thesis, in which
Owens compared the male undergraduates she had slept with while at Duke, many
of them athletes. Her friends, amused, forwarded the document to their friends.
Soon the parody went viral, the recirculation fueled partially by recent memories of
Duke athletes being charged and then acquitted of rape. It was the wildﬁre spread
that captured the media’s attention, yet another captivatingly familiar cautionary
tale about how ‘The Youth’ don’t properly think through the risks of ‘pressing
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send’. Deborah Hastings, a journalist, described Karen Owens’ misadventures as
naı¨vete´ about the dangers of accidently entering the public sphere: ‘It’s Internet
101: Don’t e-mail while drunk, sex-texting is never private and everything on the
Internet never really dies. Before you hit that send button, remember you can’t take
it back. But it appears people still don’t get it.’ Her comments reveal a common set
of assumptions circulating in the United States that everyone’s private communi-
cation is a misstep away from entering the risk-laden public sphere when they
incautiously use the wrong medium. And for commentators like Hastings, other
people, especially young people, are never mindful enough of the risks.
A US neoliberal conception of subjectivity shapes why these narratives of the
risks of new media are so compelling nowadays. In part, this has to do with
changing perceptions of the public sphere, which Tocqueville (1838) and
Habermas (1962) theorized as an arena of political exploration essential for dem-
ocracy. For many living in the United States, the public sphere is increasingly being
seen as a sphere of risks, of virality, at the same time as these Americans’ under-
standings of technological structures often make what counts as public speech
ambiguous and under redeﬁnition. While at any moment there are many diﬀerent
historically and culturally speciﬁc perspectives on how publics are constituted, two
distinct and mutually constitutive visions of publics are at play when the US public
sphere is perceived as risk-laden thusly. My argument focuses not on the nature of
the public sphere (a more Habermasian kind of project) but rather on how people
think about the public sphere (Warner, 2002).1
There is an increasingly popular discourse in the United States framing the
public sphere and public speech in terms of risk and individual responsibility
because of two conceptual shifts. First, there are now two widespread incompatible
yet mutually constitutive conceptions of publics. There is a public described by
Michael Warner as comprised of anonymous strangers that exists alongside a
public comprised of people intentionally given access to and enacting (or refusing
to act upon) their access to a public. In the process, the imagined anonymous
public sphere becomes re-deﬁned through contrast with publics structured
around accessibility. Second, neoliberal logics in the United States require a sub-
jectivity that disciplines one into evaluating all acts in terms of risk, reward, and
responsibility, including speech acts.2 This is an extension of a fundamental shift in
the capitalist metaphors that structure the US neoliberal self. The classic liberal
capitalist self no longer holds sway, in which one owned oneself as though the self
were property. Under this neoliberal logic, one owns oneself as though the self were
a business, entering into alliances metaphorically with other businesses while con-
stantly negotiating the risks and responsibilities of these alliances.
Building on these insights, I have sought to unpack through interviews how
people’s own analysis of publics shapes their engagements with publics. In the
following, I ﬁrst discuss the vantage-point my ethnographic research oﬀers on
changing notions of public speech. I then interweave arguments I have made else-
where about an emerging notion of publics structured along notions of
access (Gershon, 2010: ch. 5) and the contours of neoliberal subjectivity
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(Gershon, 2011a). I also discuss how this conception of the public sphere as a site
of neoliberal risk humanizes contemporary risks in public speech by foregrounding
individual agency and drawing attention away from corporate and government
surveillance.
The ever-elusive neoliberal digital native
When I ﬁrst read about Owens’ Powerpoint sex thesis, I felt a wave of resignation –
Americans’ anxieties about new media were re-surfacing yet again in what has
become for me an increasingly familiar narrative. I often encounter these anxieties
because of my research on how Americans use new media to break up with each
other. What are some standard elements of this narrative? A young person says
something inappropriate, often sexually explicit or racist, because that person does
not understand the potential publicness of a speech act, or how publics are orga-
nized. This goes viral, largely because of other young people initially. The media
and blog spheres then circulate a news story based primarily on the very fact of the
story’s virality. In commenting on how widespread the story is, there is another
ﬂurry of criticism within media circles about how young people these days don’t
understand a putatively universal aspect of public speech, that one has no control
over who has access to one’s words.
This is a narrative structure that illustrates one way in which Americans are
responding to the ‘newness’ of new media, and thus creating cultural meaning
around the concept of ‘newness.’ This point is crucial for an ethnographic argu-
ment that takes ‘newness’ not as a pre-given category but as a socially constructed
quality (see Sturken et al., 2004). Americans historically have responded to new
media as ‘new’ by being troubled by its isolating eﬀects or by rejoicing in its
potential for new connections. Americans often portray vulnerable groups as
dupes of this newness: women, children, and poor immigrants are predominantly
among those said to be easily led astray by the hazards inherent to a speciﬁc new
medium (see Marvin, 1988; Bauman, 2010). Today, in various US media stories or
American daily conversations, young people are singled out as digital natives
or particularly foolish new media users, or both. Deploying generational diﬀerence
to comment on newness has been historically a well-rehearsed strategy. However,
there are elements of this narrative that are speciﬁc to the contemporary moment –
the neoliberal-inﬂected conceptualization of both the public/private boundary and
the public sphere.
Two aspects of this common narrative structure stand out to the ethnographer.
First, there is the concept of a generation, or a generational divide. And second,
there are the familiar tropes of neoliberal risk. The concept of generation is per-
forming signiﬁcant explanatory work; it is a convenient shorthand for people as
they reﬂect on social change (see Liechty, 1995; Petersen, 1976; Suslak, 2009).
In the instances I consider, generation is pointing to a mixture of innocence and
technological sophistication. On the one hand, young people are supposedly com-
fortable using a wide range of relatively new technologies. On the other hand,
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they repeatedly make social blunders based on their willingness to use these tech-
nologies. They putatively do not comprehend the consequences of public speech, a
misapprehension explained through the broad brushstrokes of ‘generation’.
Other scholars have pointed to how inadequate the generational divide is as an
explanation for heterogeneous practices. Livingstone contends that the stereotype
of the digital native does not map onto how children in fact use the internet during
diﬀerent stages of childhood and adolescence (Livingstone, 2009). Gray’s ethnog-
raphy (2009) shows that digital access and use is strongly shaped by geography,
sexual identity, and class, perhaps as much as or more than it is by generation.
Often generational explanations can overlook substantive class divides.
There is another familiar pattern to notice: how these stories allocate responsi-
bility. This is a framing that ethnographic critics of neoliberalism regularly ﬁnd
deeply suspect (see Rankin, 2004; Greenhouse, 2009). The sender of the message is
always maximally responsible for ‘pushing send’. Other actors are absolved – the
designers of the technologies, the corporations distributing the technologies, and
the people forwarding the message over and over again. Instead, the cautionary tale
revolves around people who supposedly misunderstand the consequences of their
actions.
The focus is on people’s skills at imagining future scenarios, as Giddens (1990)
and Beck (1992) have argued. These narratives about utterances circulating
improperly are narratives in which agency is maximally attributed to careless
people who would behave otherwise if only they knew better. As Papachrassi
(2010) has pointed out, companies and governments are currently actively collect-
ing massive data sets comprised of internet postings. Yet the risks assumed by
thoughtless people pushing send are not the risks of privacy undone by corpor-
ations and governments, nor are they presented as violations of civil rights. These
are ever-reassuring narratives of careless people circulating information that has
the potential to be socially explosive – reassuring, because the narratives draw
attention away from larger structural encroachments. What becomes risky is
placed squarely on individual shoulders, a familiar neoliberal move.
What ethnography adds
While a critical textual analysis provides valuable insights when examining this
often-repeated narrative structure about the hazards accompanying the newness
of new media, ethnographic research can change one’s perspective on the commu-
nicative practices that periodically erupt into such titillating narratives. My ethno-
graphic research leads me to argue that Americans’ conceptions of publics are in
ﬂux at the moment. Some people continue to think of publics in terms of anonym-
ity while others begin to understand publics in terms of access, which is ‘a com-
bination of reachability and responsiveness’ (Nippert-Eng, 2010: 160).
In 2007–8, I interviewed 72 people about how they were using new media to end
relationships, both romantic relationships and friendships. Because I was studying
break-ups, I only had access to data through interviews. No one in the middle of a
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break-up conversation was likely to say: ‘Wait a minute, is this a break-up con-
versation? I know a professor who really wants to study this. Can you hold on just
a sec while I call her and see if she can get over here and take notes on our
interaction?’ I did collect some digitally produced texts about ending relationships,
but for the most part my analysis has been based on interviews.3 I used these
interviews to provide insights into the stories people tell their friends and families,
into their habits of speech, and into their media ideologies and their media
practices.
Interviews provided me with insights into Americans’ own social analysis of
theirs’ and others’ new media practices. The people I interviewed were primarily
undergraduates between the ages of 18 and 22 who attended my home institution,
Indiana University. I would ask large lecture classes if anyone had a good story
about break-ups and new media that they were willing to tell me. I also solicited
interviews by emailing large university departments as well as identity-based organ-
izations on campus, such as the Asian-American center. While initially I attempted
snowball-sampling, this technique rarely proved successful for this project (it has
been much more successful in my other ethnographic projects).
I was interviewing college students who were not in the same social circles, and
who were trying to ﬁgure out how to end relationships, often, although not always,
reluctantly. In my interviews, I found time and time again that people settled on
how to behave by chatting with friends and family. They did not follow widely
agreed upon social norms, indeed widespread etiquette often did not exist for spe-
ciﬁc situations. As a consequence, when those I interviewed use new media, they are
encountering a multiplicity of practices, including diﬀerent ways to speak in public
as well as diﬀerent ideas about what it means to speak in public.
People developed ideas of what were appropriate or inappropriate ways to use
new media by asking about and observing the pockets of practice in which they
dwell. Encountering this diversity in media practices is part of the way in which
people experience technologies as ‘new’ nowadays: they are repeatedly analyzing a
profusion of other people’s non-standardized media practices (see Gershon, 2010).
People would often respond to this range of practices with critique – in interviews
they frequently described their strong sense that there was a right way to use new
communicative technologies, and others should know better. Thus, while they
might be surrounded by diﬀerent ways of speaking in public, they would explain
to me that some ways of speaking in public were clearly wrong, although those
I interviewed diﬀered in what they found acceptable.
This form of critique would come up in my interviews as critiques of other
agemates’ public speech. Undergraduates would frequently tell me that people
their age did not understand the consequences of their public speech, invoking
generational arguments. For example, Beth, a senior, said: ‘Maybe I’m getting
too old for Facebook . . .These young kids are doing all these crazy things on
Facebook. I seriously feel like I just turned 40.’ Beth is criticizing her own gener-
ation and positioning herself as removed from her own generation. She is also
voicing the critique in the media stories I opened with, in which journalists
Gershon 5
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expressed shock and dismay about what young people are willing to say in public.
Turning to generation as an overarching explanation helped to disguise the fact
that Americans are concocting etiquette solutions in small groups informally when
a speciﬁc problem about new media arises.
Seeing across publics
I want to use these ethnographically inspired points to focus on an aspect of publics
that is generally in the margins of scholarly work on publics: what happens in the
intersection between publics? In particular, I am interested in how new technologies
have aﬀordances that allow people to be quite conscious of the diﬀerences between
types of publics, and the movements between them. Warner (2002) addresses the
intersection between publics to a certain extent when he discusses how counter-
publics experience their own limitations in contrast to hegemonic publics that do
not present as radical poetic world-making alternatives. Yet here I am not discuss-
ing counterpublics, or the movement between publics as a tension between hege-
monic practices and their alternatives. Richard Bauman and Patrick Feaster (2005)
also suggest the possibility of multiple types of publics, delineating the diﬀerent
kinds of publics available and crucially revising Warner’s account. They describe
three diﬀerently constituted publics that were addressed when public oratory was
ﬁrst recorded during the decades after phonographs were introduced. Bauman and
Feaster suggest that recordings included a public that was
part of an assembled group of co-participants in a public event, public understood
here in the sense of taking place in public space, openly accessible, on view, collectively
enacted. Let us call this an assembled . . . or gathered public. Second, the phonograph’s
reiteration of the speech, and the recognition that it is a reiteration, invokes a histor-
ically founded public, made up of those who are heir to the legacy of the memorialized
ancestors. And third, it invokes what we might call a distributive public, constituted by
the dissemination of the text: those who have active or passive knowledge of it as a
text and as a sign. (Bauman and Feaster, 2005: 40, emphasis in original)
While Bauman and Feaster usefully posit these diﬀerent kinds of publics, they leave
it for others to unpack how these publics intersect, and how people and texts move
between these diﬀerent types of publics. Building on these three scholars’ work, I
am analyzing what the public sphere looks like from the vantage point of a nascent,
historically and culturally speciﬁc perspective on publics, one in which publics are
deﬁned by accessibility, especially when this shift occurs in the context of neoliberal
logics.
There is a growing literature that takes neoliberalism to be oﬀering new wine in
old vessels. US neoliberal perspectives claim to rely on familiar concepts emerging
from Enlightenment and liberal capitalist traditions, while in fact transforming
their meanings and uses (see Greenhouse, 2010; Brown, 2006). Greenhouse
points out, for example, that there is ‘a marked tendency for neoliberal political
6 Ethnography 0(00)
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restructuring and resigniﬁcation to borrow from older social forms – for example,
borrowing the language of rights to sustain markets, citizens’ forums to deﬂect
social movements, public oﬃce for pursuit of private interests, and credit relation-
ships as channels of social control’ (Greenhouse, 2010: 4). As these top-down
ideological shifts take hold, it is up to ethnographers to track how people on the
ground are engaging with neoliberal frameworks in their daily lives. In the process,
people on the ground are often obliged to mobilize other concepts, such as the
public sphere, in directions that neoliberal thinkers such as Frederick Hayek and
Milton Friedman might never have predicted. This larger recent literature on neo-
liberalism takes it to be the obligation of social analysts to critique these shifts
(Brown, 2003, 2006; Gershon, 2011a; Greenhouse, 2010; Maurer, 1999; Mirowski
and Plehwe, 2009; O’Malley, 1996).
My ethnographic research on break-ups oﬀers me a certain vantage-point on
this set of issues. I was not only interested in the conversation in which two people
decided to break up, I was also tracing how people disentangled their mediated
connections in a break-up’s aftermath. The public sphere, if discussed, was being
understood as a forum running parallel to the many (often medium-speciﬁc) pub-
lics with which my interviewees engaged. In addition, these publics were often
described as more bounded than Michael Warner suggests, straddling the perceived
public/private divide.
Technology and the public/private divide
When Americans express anxiety about messages turning viral, they are expressing
concern about how new technologies allow speech acts to cross diﬀerent types of
publics without the author’s consent, and thus a concern about ‘newness’. Every
new technology has a structure that alters knowledge circulation and thus aﬀects
how people can establish and re-establish what might be construed as a ‘public’ vs.
‘private’ divide. This is not to say that technological structures determine commu-
nication, but rather that there is a dialogic relationship between a technological
structure and people’s media ideologies and practices (see Gershon, 2010, 2011b).
These technologies alter the types of metapragmatic information that accompanies
every utterance.4 When people reﬂect on these changes, which they do when dis-
cussing risky speech, they often frame these in terms of the ‘newness’ of these
technologies.
My interviewees would comment on how certain technology gave them meta-
pragmatic information for interpreting a message, often providing them insight
into how the speaker was presupposing a diﬀerent public/private divide than
they found acceptable. Beth told me that she had been dumped by an email sent
from her lover’s Blackberry.
Beth: And it was divided into subsections as to why it won’t work out – A, B, and
C. . . .And he decided to send me a very business-like email categorizing why it is not
going to work. . . .
Gershon 7
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Ilana: He sent you an email?
Beth: Yeah, he sent me an email. It was fabulous. I could’ve killed him.
Ilana: Why did he choose an email? You had Skype, so he could have called you.
Beth: Oh yeah . . .He owned his own business, he is very fast-paced. Honestly, he
probably sent it from his Blackberry. . . . I was totally in love with this guy, I was
going to move to go to law school and you just sent me an A. B. C. break-up email, so
I don’t know . . . the fact that it can be sent from his handheld. Oh, I am going to ship
an order, I am going to jump real quick to this meeting, I am going to break up with
my girlfriend, hold on. This is not on your ‘to-do’ list, I am not a ‘to-do’ for today.
She was oﬀended by the formality of the email, how it mimicked business memos.
She was also hurt by the fact that he used his Blackberry to send her this message, in
part because this was a device he used to manage so many of his professional con-
tacts. Because everymessage originating on a Blackberry has an added tag ‘sent from
my Blackberry’,5 Beth received additional cues about the context surrounding her
ex-lover as he was communicating with her about the dissolution of their relation-
ship. And she was oﬀended because he was not treating communication with her as
private or signiﬁcant enough and he was using a work-related device to communicate
what she would like to be a most personal and thoughtful ending.6 While the
people I interviewed understandably did not use the term metapragmatics, this
was often the focus of my interviewees’ analysis when they describe how communi-
cation technologies are enabling Americans to draw boundaries between what is
professional and what is personal, what is public and what is private.
As Americans begin to negotiate explicitly with the ways new technologies alter
how communication is made public or private, often ideas of how a public is
constituted will also begin to change. In Publics and Counterpublics, Warner
(2002) describes how one perspective on publics emerged as a historically contin-
gent concept in which stranger-sociality and anonymity are key elements.7 Yet the
structures of technology that Americans are using now for uttering public speech
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the historical examples Warner draws upon for his
argument. These new structures enable Americans to believe they have a certain
degree of control or insight into who is part of the public they address, whether or
not this belief is warranted in practice. These beliefs are encouraged partially by
many social media sites’ interfaces, because the structures of social media sites
request that users monitor the boundaries of their publics, consciously selecting
members of their network by ongoing friending and defriending.
Publics and access
As American undergraduates use these technologies, they increasingly think about
publics in terms of accessibility, while previously the publics Warner describes were
8 Ethnography 0(00)
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constituted in part by assumptions of the anonymity of participants. In one of my
interviews, Amelie described succinctly how people’s ideas about what counts as
the public imagined in one’s public address can be multiple and contradictory. We
were discussing when she might bring up information she learned on Facebook in
an in-person conversation, and she explained that she never would.
You don’t want to hear that people are looking at your business even though it’s weird
because you make it public. So it shouldn’t be all that weird to ﬁnd out that people see
it, but it is. I think when people think of public, they mostly just think of their circle of
friends and maybe some of their friends’ friends. But people don’t really realize how
public public is. So I think that is why it is so weird to ﬁnd out that a stranger has seen
this stuﬀ.
Amelie is describing this new understanding of public speech in the context of her
responsibilities as a member of a public structured along the lines of imagined
access. She cannot bring herself to openly acknowledge that she is the unantici-
pated stranger in someone else’s public in her face-to-face conversations with that
person.8
Elsewhere, I suggest that ﬁve aspects of the publics Warner delineates change
when publics are deﬁned in terms of access instead of anonymity, including accom-
panying notions of responsibility as members of publics (Gershon, 2010). First,
part of people’s participation in such a public involves monitoring the boundaries
of that particular public, managing or actively imagining who exactly might par-
ticipate. People often imagine their audience as existing on a continuum from
barely known acquaintance to friend, although sometimes they will insist that
only people they know well are part of their publics. Second, when anonymity is
no longer cloaking one’s participation, it becomes far more important that every-
one within one’s social circle participate in a particular network. Groups of friends
will often create social media proﬁles for those friends who refuse to use a particu-
lar medium because otherwise these non-user friends are tacitly excluded from
oﬄine social interactions. In short, people not only actively police the boundaries
of publics, they also insist on certain inclusions, regardless of whether someone
wants to use that speciﬁc medium in the ﬁrst place. Third, Americans often ﬁnd it
socially complicated to address publics they perceive as internally divided. That is,
a networked public might in practice include groups that oﬄine are kept separate –
friends, family, employers, and co-workers are not always allowed the same access
to one’s utterances oﬄine (see boyd, 2010). Social networking sites often make this
into a dilemma people actively must address.9 Fourth, when anonymity no longer
shields members of a public, these members have increasingly more responsibilities
in responding to utterances. Finally, as people’s ideas of publics increasingly
become structured along lines of access, so too do their ideas of intimate or private
interaction. A quick indication that this transformation is occurring is the number
of people who told me that sharing passwords was a new gesture of intimacy, that
they would share their passwords with their lovers or best friends as markers of
Gershon 9
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their closeness. A focus on access draws people’s attention to the speciﬁc and varied
sets of alliances that comprise the publics in which they participate.
In Publics and Counterpublics (2002), Warner’s account of how publics operate is
not medium-speciﬁc or even very medium-sensitive, although he does focus on
texts, loosely deﬁned.10 While Warner in this later work does not focus as much
on people’s media ideologies about the technological structures, this is a shift from
his earlier more historically grounded analysis. In Letters of the Republic (1990), his
book on publics during the US revolutionary period, Warner argues that people’s
media ideologies about newspapers had to shift in order for a democratic public in
the newly formed American republic to be imaginable. It was not enough for
newspapers to be widely available. Initially, audiences thought only the sermons
and the conversations following sermons were appropriate forums for discussing
diﬀerent political ideas – newspapers were not. People had to begin thinking about
newspapers and pamphlets diﬀerently, and to value the anonymity that printed
material was seen to allow. For early American colonists, anonymity had not pre-
viously been an important component of public printed debates, this valuation had
to become commonplace before newspapers and pamphlets could become widely
regarded as useful media for creating appropriate forums for democratic publics.
Anonymity is central to the addressivity of any utterance in Warner’s public,
and this addressivity presupposed both strangerhood and unmarked interchange-
ability in its listeners. As a consequence, utterances in a public were understood to
have a double addressivity – speaking both to the speciﬁc person hearing the utter-
ance at the same time as speaking to a generalized and ill-deﬁned public.
Public speech can have great urgency and intimate import. Yet we know that it was
addressed not exactly to us, but to the stranger we were until the moment we hap-
pened to be addressed by it. . . .To inhabit public discourse is to perform this transi-
tion continually, and to some extent it remains present to consciousness. Public speech
must be taken in two ways: as addressed to us and as addressed to strangers. (Warner,
2002: 77)
Because of this form of double address, publics are foundationally supposed to be a
collection of strangers who are deﬁned by anonymity, not their contextually-
speciﬁc subject positions.
Yet publics based on anonymity are no longer the primary widespread form of
public that Americans engage with nowadays. Currently people also participate in
publics in which the address is understood to be directed both to a speciﬁc person
and to a selected group, in which the category of stranger is no longer the most
salient for understanding the double address of public speech. Those I interviewed
are beginning to think of publics in terms of who explicitly has access to a par-
ticular public. Access is not a new issue for scholars studying publics. In the past,
some people were tacitly excluded from certain publics because they were illiterate,
not familiar with a given public’s register, or too poor to be able to participate in a
public with boundaries predicated on cost (see Briggs and Mantini-Briggs, 2004).
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Warner acknowledges this, but claims that people participating in publics can not
be explicitly aware of this and participate in a public. I argue this social imagin-
ation is changing: the undergraduates I interviewed have a diﬀerent notion of
publics based on accessibility. The two perspectives on publics co-exist, deﬁning
each other and occasionally clashing.
This is not a change brought about by technological structures, or not entirely
so. Design features can encourage a certain form of awareness, but it is possible to
use these sites without this awareness. Facebook and other social networking sites
require that one accepts people into one’s network. This part of the interface cer-
tainly explicitly requests that people have a level of awareness about who is in their
networked public. In my own research, this awareness was heightened in part
because of Facebook’s regular changes to its privacy settings, which also strongly
encouraged people to be aware of what others could see on their proﬁle, and what
they could not.11
While Facebook and other social media sites encourage a particular form of
awareness, even blogs – whose interface does not encourage an explicit awareness
of who one’s readers are – have users who think about publics in terms of access
and not anonymity. In his book The Peep Diaries, Hal Niedzviecki tells a story
about Padme, an Alaskan housewife whose blog attracted millions of readers.
It wasn’t her detailed account of her children’s birthday parties or her grocery
shopping that fostered such interest, it was the interspersed frank details about
her S/M relationship with her husband that drew readers. This was a blog whose
interface did not disclose to Padme who exactly her readers might be. Technically,
she was writing to an anonymous audience. Yet when she discussed her possible
readers, her analysis presumed that her audience would behave as though her
public was deﬁned by access. When Niedzviecki asked her if she was concerned
that acquaintances might read her blog, she
agrees that a surfeit of details in the blog would easily allow her to be identiﬁed even
by people who only know her casually. Still, I can tell she doesn’t really think that will
ever happen. Even if you came across the blog, she muses, would you really go around
telling people about it? After all, you’d have to explain how you found it and what
you were doing there. The embarrassment defense is convincing to Padme. She’ll
keep things separate and no one will know, and everything will be ﬁne.
(Niedzviecki, 2009: 25)
She saw her public as made responsible through embarrassment, willing to
police their own responses in order to avoid socially awkward encounters.
I found in my interviews that what Padme assumes is also how my interviewees
understood public speech. Those I spoke with often believe that members of
a public will experience certain obligations in managing information, and as a
result will act responsibly. At the same time, they imagine that they can anticipate
who might read their material, and that certain people will willingly choose not to
participate in that particular public. This is an imagination of a public that is based
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on a reﬂexive focus on access, not Warner’s historically situated account of a public
comprised of anonymous strangers.
Travelling between access and anonymity
These two diﬀerent imaginations of publics clash enough in practice to have
inspired certain internet users – self-identiﬁed as trolls – to adopt pedagogical
projects in which they instruct others about how to use the internet as liberal
subjects.12 Clashes over what counts as an appropriate imagination of a public
have created a level of awareness that is embodied in trolls, who act as meta-
monitors and tricksters advocating for publics based on anonymity. Trolls are
most well known as people who play pranks and post inﬂammatory statements
online; they are less well known for the recent spate of political activism, ﬁrst
against Scientology and subsequently against a wide range of actors deemed by
trolls to hinder free speech (including governments oppressing the Arab Spring and
Wikileaks). Here I am inﬂuenced by Gabriella Coleman’s ethnography with mul-
tiple groups, some tellingly named Anonymous, in which she argues that hackers
and trolls are operating along classic liberal principles and critiquing a neoliberal
world (Coleman, 2011). Trolling, as she describes it, ‘often consists of an unpre-
dictable combination of the following: telephone pranking, having many unpaid
pizzas sent to the target’s home, DDoSing, and most especially, splattering per-
sonal information, preferably humiliating, all over the Internet’ (Coleman, 2011).
In pulling these pranks, trolls are critiquing those people who refuse to see public
speech on the internet as governed by classic liberal principles of free speech and
anonymity. In Warner’s account, public utterance is always partially addressed to
the liberal stranger, a form of address that internet trolls will voice a nostalgia for
when they seek to educate others on the internet into adopting what they consider
an appropriate detached relationship to web-based utterances. In their conjoined
language and media ideologies, trolls maintain that the internet is not a space for
people likely to take words or the internet personally. Take, for instance, the case
of Jason Fortuny. In a 2008 New York Times magazine article on trolls, Matthias
Schwartz reported on the logic of Jason Fortuny, a self-identiﬁed troll: ‘The will-
ingness of trolling ‘‘victims’’ to be hurt by words, he argued, makes them complicit,
and trolling will end as soon as we all get over it.’ Schwartz went on to quote
Fortuny openly imagining himself as participating in a pedagogical project.
Fortuny claimed that his perspective ‘allows me to ﬁnd people who do stupid
things and turn them around’. From Fortuny’s perspective, people on the internet
misunderstand fundamental aspects of how the internet functions –that is, they
have the wrong media ideology. His pranks, and trolls’ pranks in general, serve to
instruct others about the right relationship to mediated words in a public. Trolls
self-consciously decide to embody the risk that a public sphere can represent when
one refuses to engage in the public sphere as a liberal stranger. They are speaking
from the position of liberal subjects critiquing people who aren’t anonymous stran-
gers when speaking publicly.
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Is there a sense in which the public speech acts that trolls criticize are in dialogue
with a neoliberal logic? Once one begins to see a public as a network of alliances,
these publics can easily be framed in terms of some of the leitmotifs of neoliberal-
ism, and in particular, anxieties about appropriate allocations of risk and respon-
sibility. I have argued elsewhere that neoliberalism requires a diﬀerent kind of
subjectivity than liberal capitalism requires, a subjectivity where the self has a
reﬂexive managerial distance to oneself. Under liberal capitalism, one owns oneself
as though one’s self was landed property such that one can rent one’s capacities in
the marketplace through wage labor (see MacPherson, 1962). Under neoliberalism,
the self is metaphorically a business and practically a compilation of skills and
alliances that must continually be managed and enhanced using a market-speciﬁc
logic (see Gershon, 2011a). When one manages oneself according to a market
rationality, one then begins to assess one’s alliances in terms of risk, reward, and
responsibility. Relationships of all kinds under neoliberalism are of mixed value –
while often providing resources and enhancing the self, they are also risky.
I should note that risk is not an unqualiﬁed danger from a neoliberal perspective.
Rather, risk provides opportunities for success; it is a requisite part of a neoliberal
engagement with future possibilities (see Maurer, 1999; O’Malley, 1996). In terms
of a public, alliances are essential for a public to exist in the ﬁrst place, and yet
alliances are also the source of knowledge circulation that becomes a problem
through unwelcome revelation or other interactions with detrimental social
consequences.
Public speech and other risks
The stories of public speech gone viral are only one form of risk people recount
when they insist that technology is structuring communication in new ways.
Another way that alliances are risky is that the responsibility one has as a
member of a social networking public is not always apparent, and this ambiguity
exists on many fronts. When someone sees information by being part of someone’s
Facebook public, is one obligated to respond? And if so, in what medium? And
how does one initiate a conversation that doesn’t oﬀend? Rachel reported how
insulted she was by many people’s attempts to contact her after she changed her
relationship status on Facebook.
Rachel: When I took my relationship status oﬀ, I put ‘I don’t want to f–ing talk about
it. Don’t f–ing ask me.’ So I get a lot of ‘hey, I was just thinking of you’. And I am like
‘yeah, I’m sure. Four of you just so happened to be thinking of me today, right now.
I’m sure.’ I got messages from people who were like ‘I know you really don’t want to
talk about it, but you know, if you want to talk.’ Of course, it was my one friend who
just got out of a four year relationship. . . .And then I got some people, I was so mad,
like my best friend from 8th grade: ‘heyyy, how are you??’ Some girl I took a class with
last year who I haven’t talked to in nine months ‘Heyyy, whassup?’ Don’t talk to me.
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Rachel outlines the ambivalence she felt towards being contacted. Some contacts
she found acceptable, others she found nosey and intrusive. Others I interviewed
said they could feel obligated to contact someone who announced a break-up but
were uncertain how best to go about doing so. After all, how one’s eﬀorts will be
received is unpredictable, and one might always provoke an embittered response.
Sometimes accidental revelations can lead to social dilemmas that involve the
whole family. One woman I spoke with explained that her nuclear family had
recently learned that they were not as close to another family as they previously
thought. She believed that she was Facebook friends with her cousin, who had
recently become engaged. She found out about the engagement – or, more pre-
cisely, about the engagement party – because she was friends with her cousin’s
ﬁance´e. Her cousin had defriended her prior to the engagement party to prevent
her from ﬁnding out through Facebook that she was not invited to the party
(admittedly, she was in Indiana and her cousin was in London). Her cousin’s
ﬁance´e posted photographs of the party, which she saw through her newsfeed.
She wondered why she was only getting these photographs through his
Facebook proﬁle and, upon checking, discovered that her cousin had indeed
defriended her. Knowledge leaks out in these ways,13 making Facebook friendships
the source of information that can potentially spark conﬂict, whether or not one
has tried to anticipate such a scenario by defriending.
Publics are risky not only because of accidental revelation and ambiguous obli-
gation, but also because these publics based on access are adjacent to and are
always potentially able to intersect with a public sphere based on anonymity
where information can circulate in openly uncontrolled and unexpected ways.
People who engage in publics as though they were built on access are aware that
there are other types of publics out there. From the perspective of an access-based
public, a public based on anonymity is one that inevitably contains risk.
Anonymity is, in these moments, seen as cloaking behavior, allowing people to
behave as irresponsibly as they might wish. After all, people in an anonymity-based
public do not envision that they are participating in a network in which risk,
reward and responsibility must be actively balanced and managed by all partici-
pants. Sadie explained this perception when she discussed her own internal debate
about whether to adopt the honesty box, a Facebook application that allows
people to send anonymous messages to a Facebook proﬁle that adopts this
application:
Sadie: The honesty box, even though I thought about using that with a friend, but
I actually found the thought that it was anonymous very unsettling. Because it is
counter to so much of Facebook, and that is part of the reason that people use
Facebook, I think, because it is not anonymous. Because even if you don’t, like the
really dumb and/or malicious people think that what they do do don’t have conse-
quences, but if you are smart, you know. Like people still make mistakes, like fresh-
man especially, like freshman and sophomores, underage kids . . . not the best
judgment, but still part of you knows that other people will see it at the very least.
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At the very least, even if you don’t care, you know someone will see it. So the thought
that people could say anything they wanted about you and you didn’t know who they
were, I ﬁnd it skeevy. I mean it is one thing on Myspace and the communities I read,
mainly the tattoo community . . . people say nasty things to each other. But that is
more anonymous than on Facebook.
Here Sadie oﬀers a fairly typical account of anonymity as hazardous, as creating
great possibilities for hostile speech, speech that she also depicts as irresponsible.
Anonymity, according to her media ideology, subverts accountability. Here is an
instance in which familiar categories, such as anonymity, are being re-imagined
because of a new conception of publics combined with people’s media ideologies of
speciﬁc technological structures.
Pushing send
I have examined moments that publics are interwoven, and how American under-
graduates perceive forms of address that circulate between diﬀerently structured
publics. This occurs in US contexts in which people are actively concerned with the
‘newness’ of new technologies. Journalists and those I interviewed are constantly
critiquing others’ uses of media as though there was a widespread etiquette, which
one learns does not in fact exist when one studies people’s disparate media ideol-
ogies and practices. These narratives also reveal tensions between an emerging
understanding of publics that coheres around a concept of access and an older
understanding of publics as requiring address to anonymous strangers. Speaking in
public now sometimes means explicitly addressing a bounded network limited by
accessibility, and may no longer be an address determined by anonymity and ever-
expanding circulation. And if one thinks in terms of a public based on access, then
the public sphere looks like a network of very risky speech and anonymity a cover
for antagonism.
Neoliberal logics have encouraged people to frame the contrast between access
and anonymity in terms of risks. This occurs in the context of neoliberal discourses
that frame ideal alliances as ones in which risk and responsibility are equitably
distributed based on a market logic (Gershon, 2010). In this article, I have been
focusing on one possible risk – the speech acts that leap between a public imagined
in terms of access to a larger one imagined as a public sphere. Risk, however, is not
simply about a movement of information away from a public controlled by access.
And here I want to defend the perspective of those I interviewed and suggest the
common media stories about the hazards of ‘pushing send’ contribute to a neo-
liberal logic. These narratives of viral messages are neoliberal because risk is max-
imally linked to the behavior of individuals, and agency is located only with the
putative speaker. They overlook how statements are de-contextualized, circulated
through other people’s actions, and aided by the embedded social narratives pre-
sent in a technology’s materiality. The narratives also aid neoliberal logic by ignor-
ing the infrastructures created by the long histories of corporate and government
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practices. The people who push send are navigating multiple and mutually deﬁning
social imaginations about public spheres and public speech, not simply acting out
of ignorance or carelessness.
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Notes
1. For a comprehensive overview of ethnographic literature on publics see Cody (2011).
2. For a summary of neoliberal subjectivity see Gershon (2011a).
3. I discuss the differences between analyzing the textual traces of a break-up versus inter-
viewing in Gershon (2012).
4. Metapragmatics here specifically refers to the information that guides addressees on
how to parse the contexts and putative authorial intentions that prompted that particu-
lar utterance. Metapragmatics is more generally used by linguistic anthropologists to
describe the elements of language used to orient audiences towards what an utterance is
accomplishing.
5. Beth explained in the interview that this tag could not be erased by the user at the time.
6. I have pointed out elsewhere that many of the break-up stories I collected focused with
dismay on the medium or words used in the break-up conversations. It is possible that
even if he hadn’t used a Blackberry there would be some other aspect of the break-up
conversation that would have bothered Beth, beyond the fact that being dumped is quite
often unpleasant.
7. Counter to Warner’s own claims in Publics and Counterpublics, and in response to
various editors’ perceptive comments, I am arguing that the views of publics discussed
in this article are historically and culturally specific and, while widespread, still one of
many possible vantage points on public speech Americans can inhabit at any given
historical moment.
8. Readers familiar with Irvine’s complex re-working of Goffman’s analysis of footing will
recognize Amelie’s conundrum as one based on occupying a participant role unantici-
pated by the speaker but sanctioned and even encouraged by Facebook’s interface
(Irvine, 1996). To express part of my argument in terms of participant roles, a view
of publics based on access, conjoined with people’s media ideologies of the structures of
new technologies, also entails a different range of possible participant roles and their
attendant responsibilities than a public presuming anonymity of addressees.
9. Since I did my research, Facebook and other social network sites have created interfaces
that allow people more control in differentiating recipients and thus sending messages to
designated audiences.
10. His account suggests publics are not comprised of co-present audiences.
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11. There are also viral stories that circulate occasionally about what Facebook does
with users’ information and what fixes people can use, which Jane Goodman pointed
out to me.
12. I want to thank Paul Manning for the conversation that led to this paragraph.
13. Although the bride was inaccessible because of ethnographic constraints, one can’t help
noticing that she was primarily concerned about how information spread on Facebook
but did not seem to be as cautious about other channels. My thanks to Debra Vidali for
pointing this out.
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